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Political and legal institutions affect the extent to which the real exchange rates of oil-
exporting countries co-move with the oil price. In a simple theoretical model, strong 
institutions  insulate  real  exchange  rates  from  oil  price  volatility  by  generating  a 
smooth pattern of fiscal spending over the price cycle. Empirical tests on a panel of 33 
oil-exporting countries provide evidence that countries with high bureaucratic quality 
and strong and impartial legal systems have real exchange rates that co-move less with 
the oil price. 
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1. Introduction  
 
Empirical studies of the growth rates of countries endowed with natural resources have shown 
the paradoxal finding that countries which are amply endowed with resources tend to grow 
slower than others (Sachs and Warner, 2005; Auty, 2001; Collier and Goderis 2007a, b). One 
economic explanation for this paradoxical phenomenon is that the resource exporter’s real 
exchange rate co-moves with highly volatile commodity prices.  In price upturns, the real 
exchange rate appreciates and undercuts the competitiveness of the domestic industry. Lost 
industry is then difficult to reconstruct when the commodity price falls and over several price 
cycles, the country loses its non-resource industrial base (see Torvik, 2001 for a discussion of 
Dutch Disease models). In the case of oil-exporting countries, empirical research on the role 
of  the  oil  price  as  a  determinant  of  the  real  exchange  rate  has  yielded  ambiguous  and 
somewhat puzzling results. While strong relationships between the two variables have been 
found for some countries, weak or even negative relationships have been found for others. 
This paper aims to reconcile the mixed empirical evidence regarding the co-
movements of the currencies of oil-exporting countries with the oil price. Drawing on insights 
from models of the political economy of fiscal spending in countries that produce natural 
resources,  I  suggest  that co-movements  are conditional on a country’s  legal  and political 
institutions.  This  argument  is  clarified  in  a  simple  theoretical  model,  where  institutions 
determine the degree of myopia in state spending of oil revenue. By making spending more 
balanced over the price cycle, particular institutional setups are expected to cut off the fiscal 
spending mechanism that causes oil price volatility to spill over to the real exchange rate.  
A panel of 33 oil exporters for the period 1985-2005 is used to  empirically 
evaluate the claims of the model. The key empirical finding is that the tendency of the real 
exchange rates of these resource-exporting states to co-move with the oil price is conditional   3 
on their institutions. In particular, high bureaucratic quality and strong and impartial legal 
systems are found to be conductive toward a more insulated currency. These results indicate 
that a sound institutional setup can prevent a country from catching the Dutch Disease from a 
volatile real exchange rate. They also offer an explanation to the ambiguous findings in the 
empirical literature on real exchange rate determination in oil-exporting countries.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents previous research on oil 
prices and real exchange rates while Section 3 discusses political economy models of resource 
rent spending and institutions. Section 4 lays out the theoretical framework and section 5 
provides information  on the data and the econometric specification. Empirical results  are 
contained in section 6, and section 7 concludes.  
 
 
2. Evidence on oil prices, real exchange rates and growth  
 
A fluctuating real exchange rate impairs on economic growth. Sérven and Solimano (1993) 
find that fluctuations stemming from volatile oil prices are damaging to the non-oil sector and 
to capital formation. Bagella et al. (2006) give evidence that fluctuations lead to decreases in 
per capita income. Real exchange rate volatility is one of the central mechanisms in the so-
called Dutch Disease. In Neary and van Wijnbergen’s (1986) model, a resource rich country 
may  contract  this  disease  when  a  higher  resource  price  triggers  real  exchange  rate 
appreciation which, in turn, undercuts the competitiveness of the domestic industry producing 
traded goods. The reduction in competitiveness causes the tradable goods industry to diminish 
and the lost industry is difficult to regain in the eventual price downturn. Not only may firms 
be reluctant to invest in the face of future volatility, they may also have lost their comparative 
advantages during the period of contraction. The resulting de-industrialization is harmful to   4 
long term growth as the manufacturing industry tends to be more competitive and innovative 
than other sectors.  
Studies  of  real  exchange  rate  determination  in  oil-exporting  countries  have 
emphasized the importance of real factors such as the terms of trade or the Balassa-Samuelson 
“productivity hypothesis”
2. In these studies, terms of trade are commonly approximated by 
the real oil price (Baxter and Kourparitsas, 2000; Backus and Crucini, 1998), and some have 
used labels such as “petrocurrency” or “oil currency” to describe the perceived importance of 
this factor in explaining real exchange rate movements. Empirical evidence has however been 
inconsistent. While changes in the oil price appear to trigger currency movements in some 
countries, there seems to be little evidence for that relationship for some of the biggest oil 
exporters in the world.  
Among  the  studies  that  document  an  important  role  for  the  oil  price  real 
exchange rate determination is Korhonen and Juurikkala’s (2007) study a panel of nine OPEC 
countries
3 .  In  country -specific  contexts,  Zalduendo  (2006)  Koranchelian  (200 5)  and 
Mongardini (1998) document a key role of the oil price as a trigger of real exchange rate 
movements  in  Venezuela,  Algeria  and  Egypt  respectively .  Several  studies  also  provide 
empirical evidence in favour of the Russian Rouble being an oil currency (Spatafora and 
Stavrev, 2003; Oomes and Kalacheva, 2007).  
Contrasting these findings, researchers have reported statistically insignificant or 
numerically weak relationships between the Norwegian Krone  and the oil price (Bjørvik  et 
al.,  1998; Bjørnland and Hungnes, 2008 ;  Akram 2000; 2004).  Similarly, there has been 
substantial reluctance in labelling the Canadian dollar as a petrocurrency, with researchers 
again reporting insignificant (Gauthier and Tessier, 2002) or even negative relationships 
(Amano and van Norden, 1995) .  Finally,  in  a  study  of  the  world’s  largest  oil  exporters, 
                                                 
2 Rogoff (1996) provides a summary of the multitude of potential explanations offered by researchers to resolve 
why the speed of mean reversion of real exchange rates is too slow to be consistent with PPP.   
3 Algeria, Ecuador, Gabon, Indonesia, Iran, Kuwait, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia and Venezuela.    5 
Russia,  Norway  and  Saudi  Arabia,  Habib  and  Kalamova  (2007)  find  that  the  oil  price 
influences the movements of the Russian rouble, but that the currencies of major oil producers 
Norway and Saudi Arabia remain unaffected by price volatility.  
In single-country settings, some attempts have been made to find explanations 
for variations over time in the estimated degree of covariation between real exchange rates 
and the real oil price. Sosunov and Zamulin (2006) and Issa et al. (2006) point to the relative 
importance of oil exports in the domestic economy to account for the degree of appreciation 
following  oil  price  hikes.  Habib  and  Kalamova  (2007)  informally  discuss  the  potential 
importance of policy responses and revenue management.  
 
3. Government spending and institutions in oil-rich countries 
 
Government  consumption  impacts  on  the  real  exchange  rate  through  its  bias  toward 
nontradables over tradables (De Gregorio et al., 1994; for more recent empirical evidence, see 
Ricci  et  al.  2008).  In  the  field  of  political  economy,  researchers  have  documented  the 
tendency of natural resource exporters to overspend and created models of the institutional 
determinants of fiscal spending decisions.   
Over-expansion of the state sector is a standard result in case studies of  the 
economic policy in resource rich countries (Auty, 2001). For oil exporters, Gelb (1986; 1988) 
summarizes  his  findings  from  examining  economic  policy  choices  in  Algeria,  Ecuador, 
Indonesia, Nigeria, Trinidad and Tobago and Venezuela by noting that: “the most important 
recommendation to emerge from this study is that spending levels should have been adjusted 
to sharp rises in income levels more cautiously than they actually were” (Gelb, 1988, p.136).  
  Two  main  types  of  theoretical  models  have  been  used  to  argue  for  the 
importance of institutional determinants to the revenue spending decisions in natural resource   6 
producing states. Political economy models of rent-seeking focus on the role of powerful 
social groups in explaining the common finding of more-than-proportional increases in state 
redistribution in response to natural resource windfalls. Lane and Tornell (1999) show that 
institutions interact with resource booms and trigger higher levels of spending, directed to the 
informal sector. With the right institutional arrangements, namely “a strong legal-political 
institutional infrastructure” (Lane and Tornell, 1999, p. 22), the incentive structure for the 
rent-seeking groups is however altered, and spending increases can be avoided. In the rent-
seeking model by Mehlum et al. (2006), focus lies on the behaviour of private entrepreneurs, 
who can choose between rent seeking and productive activities. The model shows that in 
countries where the institutional framework promotes the profitability of private enterprise, 
entrepreneurs choose to engage in production rather than in the unproductive extraction of 
natural resource rents. Empirically, the authors operationalize this institutional environment 
by an index measuring law and order, bureaucratic quality, and contract enforcement (using 
the same specification as Knack and Keefer, 1995). Their empirical analysis shows that low 
institutional quality in this respect interacts with resource revenues and impact negatively on 
growth, presumably via misdirected and excessive state spending.  
  A second class of models focus on the role of patronage as a mechanism for 
excessive state spending of resources in the presence of weak institutions. If accountability of 
spending  decision  is  lacking,  the  policy  maker  can  divert  resource  revenues  to  shore  up 
political  support  and  achieve  re-election.  This  can  be  done  either  by  providing  state 
employment  to  selected  groups  (Robinson  et  al.,  2006)  or  by  misspending  money  on 
inefficient but vote-accumulating “White Elephant” projects (Robinson et al., 2006).  
Kolstad (2009) notices that the predictions of the rent-seeking and patronage models 
differ regarding which type of institutional aspects that can be expected to influence the over-
spending of resource windfalls. He sets up a horse race between the two model by empirically   7 
testing how resource revenue affect growth subject to variation in government accountability 
(from the patronage model) and  law and order (from the rent-seeking model). Using the 
democracy index from the Polity IV dataset as a proxy for the accountability of public funds 
spending,  he  opts  toward  the  rent-seeking  explanation.  The  indicator  of  government 
accountability loses its statistical significance in the empirical estimation when the rule of law 
index is included, but not vice-versa.  
   Eifert et al. (2002) offer a more thorough discussion on the intermediation of 
institutions in the spending decisions of oil exporters. Drawing on systematic case studies of 
oil-exporters with varying political systems, they construct a taxonomy of the institutional 
determinants of pro-cyclical spending behaviour. They list four institutional dimensions that 
can increase the long-sightedness and balanced nature of an oil state’s spending decisions 
over  the  oil  price  cycle  by  fostering  long  fiscal  policy  horizons,  increasing  the  level  of 
transparency and strengthening political stability. These dimensions are i) the stability of the 
political  framework  and  party  systems;  ii)  the  degree  of  social  consensus;  iii)  the 
legitimization  of  authority  and  the  means  through  which  governments  (or  aspiring 
governments) obtain and maintain support and iv) the role of state institutions in underpinning 
markets and the distribution of rents.  
 
4. Theoretical framework 
 
This section contains a stylized model of real exchange rate determination used to motivate 
the empirical specification of the paper. Consider a small open economy producing oil, a 
tradable and a non-tradable good. The non-tradable good is consumed domestically by the 
state and by private consumers, while the tradable good is consumed by domestic and foreign 
consumers. The oil producing sector is owned by the government and employs a negligible   8 
share  of  the  domestic  labor  force.  Oil  and  tradables  are  sold  on  the  world  market  at 
exogenously given prices.  
 
4.1 Production 
The  production  of  non-tradable  ( t N Y , ) and tradable goods ( t T Y , ) at time  t  is  given  by 

t i t i t i L A Y , , ,   where  1 0   ,  i A  is a productivity factor, and  i L  is the labor input in sector 
T N i ,  . Labor is fully flexible which implies that wages equalize between the two sectors 
and that the exogenous labour supply equals the sum of labor demand  t T t N t L L L , ,   . Profit 
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4.2 State and private consumption 
In  each  time  period,  the  state’s  consumption  of  non-tradables  t G  is  the  sum  of  income 
received from taxes and a fraction   of total oil revenue. Assuming that the income gained 
from taxes corresponds to a fraction   of the income of the tradable economy  t T t T Y P , , , the 
government’s consumption of non-tradables can be expressed as 
 
t t O t T t T t t N M P Y P G P , , , ,               (2) 
   9 
where  1 0    . The state obtains income from taxing the tradable sector and from selling oil 
( t M ) on the global market  at  the price  t O P ,
4. Since oil revenue will not last forever, we 
interpret the parameter  as the degree of myopia in revenue spending. A government with a 
high   will consume a large share of a sudden oil revenue increase, while a government with 
low   will  save  a  larger  share  of  that  income,  letting  a  smaller  share  spill  over  on  the 
consumption  of  non-tradables.  The  share  of  total  oil  revenue  not  spent  on  non-tradables
  t t O M P , 1    is invested by the government at the international credit market at the fixed 
interest rate r . The government’s budget constraint is hence such that investment in period 
1  t  will equal income from investment
5, oil revenue and taxes in period t, minus the amount 
spent on non-tradables in the same period.  
Turning next to the consumers in the economy, these actors own the firms, get 
income in the form of wages and profits, pay taxes and derive utility from consumption of 
non-tradable and tradable goods. To simplify the model, it is assumed that consumers are 
restricted from borrowing on the credit market. The budget constraint of consumers is  
 
t T t T t N t N t T t T t N t N C P C P Y P Y P , , , , , , , , ) 1 (      .       (3) 
 
Assuming  Cobb-Douglas  utility  with  weights   and   1 ,  a  fraction   of  total  consumer 
expenditure is spent on non-tradables, i.e.    
 
) ( , , , , , , t T t T t N t N t N t N C P C P C P   .           (4) 
                                                 
4 The IMF (2007) reports the ratios of oil revenues to total fiscal revenues as five year-averages for the 2000-
20005 period for several of the countries included in this study, namely Algeria (70.5), Angola (79.8), 
Azerbaijan (33.3), Cameroon (27.7), Colombia (10.0), Congo (Brazzaville) (69.9), Equatorial Guinea (85.2), 
Gabon (60.1), Indonesia (30.3), Iran (65.5), Kazakhstan (25.1), Kuwait (74.7), Libya (80.2), Mexico (33.3), 
Nigeria (78.9), Norway (24.0), Oman (83.4), Qatar (68.4), Russia (19.5), Saudi Arabia (83.1), Sudan (49.8), 
Trinidad and Tobago (36.4), UAE (66.1), Bolivia (20.9). 
5 Where investment in the first period is set to zero.   10 
 
We can now derive an expression for the relative demand for tradables and non-tradables. 
This  is  achieved  by  combining  the  budget  constraints  for  the  state,  and  for  consumers, 
substituting for  t N C , using the equilibrium condition for the market for non -tradable goods
6 
and by expressing all terms in the equation as shares of the size of the economy for non -
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      (5) 
 
4.3 The Foreign Economy 
Production technology, private consumption and the labor market in the foreign economy are 
identical to that in the domestic economy, but the foreign economy lacks an oil sector. Using 
* to denote the foreign economy, we can derive analogous equations (1’)-(5’). 
 
4.4 Real Exchange rate Determination 
The real exchange rate of the oil-exporting economy ( t Q ) is defined as the foreign price of a 





P E Q  , where *  denotes the foreign economy  and   t E  is  the price of 
domestic currency. An increase in  t Q hence implies real appreciation. We assume that the 
domestic and foreign price levels are geometric averages of the prices of traded and non-
traded goods with weights    1  and   respectively. We can then write the aggregate price 
                                                 
6 
t t N t N G C Y   , ,    11 
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Q          (6) 
 
 
where the law of one price is assumed to hold for the tradable good so that 
*
,, T t t T t P E P  . Next, 
equations (1) and (5), describing the relative demand and supply of tradable and non-tradable 
goods, are combined for both the domestic and the foreign economies. This enables us to 
derive the price ratios for tradable and non-tradable goods in the two economies, and inserting 





    
  






















































Q   .    (7) 




























 is  the  standard  Balassa-Samuelson  effect  (Balassa,  1964; 
Samuelson, 1964) whereby a positive shock to productivity in the domestic tradable goods 
sector will lead to real appreciation of the domestic currency. The key conclusion to be drawn 
from examining  equation (7) is that the effect  of an increase in the oil price on the real   12 
exchange rate is conditional on the degree of myopia in the government’s spending of oil 
revenue,  . We can think of this parameter as the institutional setting in which the policy 
maker operates and which creates the incentives for his or her rational spending choice.  
 
5. Empirical specification and econometric issues 
 
The next step is to construct an empirical specification of the real exchange rate equation (7). 
The  key  parameter  of  interest   ,  is  assumed  to  depend  on  a  vector  of  governance 







t i j j t i X
0
, , ,      
 
where the sub-script i denotes the country, and j = 1, 2,...,K indicates legal and political 
institutions that influence the spending behaviour of the policy maker. The first element in the 
vector  t i j X , , is set to one to test the unconditional effect of oil dependency on the real 
exchange rate (as argued by Issa et al. 2006; Sosunov and Zamulin, 2006). A Taylor 
approximation of (7), where some terms have been set to zero in accordance with  the 
theoretical expectation, yields the test equation 
 
t i j t i
K
j
t i j t i t i X S PR Q , , ,
0
, , 2 0 ,         

      (8) 
 
In this equation,  t i Q ,  is the log real exchange rate in country  i at time t, PR denotes the log 
of the productivity differential between traded and non-traded goods relative to the rest of the   13 
world, S  represents the relative size of the oil sector in the domestic economy and   is a 
random disturbance term.  
Institutional data is obtained from the Political Risk Services, a private company 
that assesses economic and political risk across a large number of countries. These data were 
introduced as institutional measures in economic research by Knack and Keefer (1995) and 
are now widely used (e.g. Hall and Jones, 1999; Acemoglu et al., 2001). Eight variables are 
chosen to reflect the key aspects of the oil-exporting country’s legal and political institutions, 
namely  1)  Bureaucratic  Quality:  the  bureaucracy’s  autonomy  from  political  pressure,  its 
strength and expertise to govern so as to avoid drastic changes in policy or interruptions in 
government services; 2) Corruption: the degree to which officials demand or accept illegal 
payments; 3) Democratic Accountability: how responsive the government is to its people, 
measured  by  the  type  of  governing  system  and  ranging  from  alternating  democracy  to 
autarchy; 4) Government Stability: the government’s ability to stay in office and to carry out 
its declared program(s); 5) Investment Profile: the composite risk from contract expropriation, 
profits repatriation and payment delays; 6) Law and Order: the strength and impartiality of the 
legal system and the degree of popular observance of the law; 7) Military in Politics: the 
degree of involvement of unelected military officials in running the state; 8) Socioeconomic 
Conditions: a summary index consisting of the three sub-components unemployment, poverty 
and consumer confidence.   
More thorough descriptions of the institutional variables are provided in Table 
A2. In the regression analysis below, all institutional indicators are standardized to have a 
mean of zero and a standard deviation of one.
7  
The remaining variables in equation (8) are constructed as follows. For the real 
exchange rate Q, the IMF:s CPI deflated real effective exchange rate index is available for 17 
                                                 
7 The four sub-components of the PRS composite political risk index not included are those measuring external 
conflict, internal conflict, ethnic tensions, and religious tensions.     14 
of the countries in the sample. For the remaining 16, I calculate real bilateral exchange rate 
indices vis-à-vis the US
8. These measures show how the nominal effective exchange rates, 
adjusted for inflation, in the home country and its trading partners’ economies, have moved 
over a period of time. Under this definition, a higher value of the real exchange rate index 
implies real appreciation. Next, the real average oil price series  O P  is derived by deflating the 
average price of crude oil in US dollars by the US consumer price index with base year 2000. 
The  real  exchange  rate  measures  and  the  real  oil  price  series  are  transformed  to  natural 
logarithms.  
As a proxy for the size of the oil sector in the domestic economy, denoted S  in 
equation (8), I calculate the share of oil exports to GDP by first multiplying volume of net oil 
exports by the oil price in current USD for each year, and then dividing by total GDP for the 
exporting country.  
A control for the Balassa-Samuelsson effect, corresponding to PR  in the test 
equation, is computed by taking the log-difference between the oil exporters’ per capita GDP 
in PPP-based constant 2000 US dollars and per capita GDP in the US. Using this proxy rests 
on the assumption that the productivity advantage of high income countries is primarily found 
in the tradable rather than the non-tradable sector.
9 Further variable details are available in 
Table A2.  
The time period 1985-2005 is selected in order to maximize data availability. 
For this period, data from the EIA on net oil  exports is used to identify 38 countries with 
positive net export values for at least half of the years. Of these countries, Iraq, Turkmenistan 
and the United Arab Emirates are excluded due to the unavailability of consistent time series 
                                                 
8 In the sub-sample of 17 countries for which both measures are available, the correlation coefficient between the 
real effective exchange rate index and the bilateral exchange rate index is 0.78. 
9 Using aggregated production to approximate for productivity differences in traded and non-traded goods in the 
domestic and foreign economies is standard practise when facing the common problem of data unavailability for 
the more exact measures. Related research resorting to this method includes studies by Koranchelian (2005) and 
Korhonen and Juurikkala (2007).   15 
for the real exchange rate or GDP. Furthermore, Brunei and Equatorial Guinea are excluded 
due to the unavailability of some institutional and political data. In the resulting sample of 33 
countries
10, net oil imports are recorded in less than 3 percent of all years. The fina l panel 
consists of 551 observations (see Appendix, Table A1 for a record of missing data) 
Concerning the choice of econometric model, macroeconomic time series may 
contain unit-roots, in which case the use of OLS can produce invalid estimates. To choose the 
appropriate econometric technique, it is therefore important to establish if the macroeconomic 
time series used, namely the real exchange rate measure ( t i Q , ), the real oil price ( t O P , ), the 
productivity differential ( t i PR , ) and the ratio of oil exports to GDP ( t i S , )
 11 are stationary or 
not. Four panel unit root tests are carried out for this purpose. The Levin, Lin & Chu (2002) 
test is employed to test for a common unit root process in the panel as a whole, while the Im, 
Pesaran & Shin, the ADF- and the PP-tests allow the AR coefficients to differ between the 
sampled countries. Table 1 summarizes the results from four panel unit root tests, which show 
coherent rejection of the null-hypothesis of non-stationarity for all three series and both test 
types.  
The real oil price time series is examined using four different unit root tests 
(data plot in Appendix, Figure A3). Results indicate a stationary series. The DFGLS and PP 
tests reject the null of unit root at one and ten percent respectively, while the KPSS test fails 
to reject the null of stationarity at the one percent level. Thus, according to the unit root test 
results, the four macroeconomic variables used in the analysis are found to be stationary. This 
allows estimation using a panel data regression model with country fixed effects, a model 
which efficiently controls for all unobservable and time-invariant country characteristics.  
                                                 
10 Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Azerbaijan, Bolivia, Cameroon, Canada, Colombia, Congo (Kinshasa), Congo 
(Brazzaville), Egypt, Gabon, Indonesia, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Libya, Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria, Norway, 
Oman, Papua New Guinea, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, United Kingdom, 
Venezuela, Vietnam and Yemen 
11 Since exports constitute a share of GDP, the two series are cointegrated by default. The ratio of exports to 
GDP variable used in this paper, which is restricted to taking on values within the interval 0-1, is hence 
stationary by definition. This is confirmed by the unit root test results.    16 
Table 1: Panel unit root tests 
  Im, Pesaran and 
Shin 
Augmented 
Dickey Fuller  Phillips-Perron 


















Notes: The table reports results of panel unit root tests, all of which test the null-hypothesis of unit root. P-
values are reported in parenthesis. The test statistics correspond to the w-stat in Im, Pesaran and Shin’s (2003) 
test together with the Fisher Chi-square statistic in the ADF- and PP-tests for individual unit root processes. 
Lag-lengths are selected according to the Schwartz criterion and all tests include a constant but no trend.   
 
 
Figures A1 and A2 show the distributions of the ordinal institutional variables. Regression 
analysis using a dataset that includes ordinal covariates with relatively few categories calls for 
caution when choosing an econometric technique. Erroneously treating ordinal variables as 
continuous may yield misleading results unless the effect of the ordinal variable is linearly 
related to its categorization (Jöreskog, 1994).
12 If this assumption is accepted, the variable can 
regarded as being measured on an interval scale where the step between each category on the 
ordinal variable is equally large. A test is constructed by decomposing the ordinal variables 
into dummy variables for each category value. For each set of dummy variables  1,2,..., iN  , 
the  restriction  1 2 3 4




           is  thereafter  tested  in  an  estimated  fixed 
effects model.
13 These tests show that the indicators for  Bureaucratic Quality, Corruption, 
Democratic Accountability, Law and Order, and Investment Profile may be assumed to be 
ordinal when interacted  with the  ratio of  oil  exports to GDP. In contrast,  this is not a 
reasonable  assumption  for  the  variables  measuring   Government  Stability,  Military 
                                                 
12 In other words, that a move between categories 0 to 1 on an ordinal variable measuring, for example, 
bureaucratic quality, leads to the same effect on the dependent variable as a move between categories 5 to 6. 
13 In the ICRG data, countries are sometimes given half points, placing them between two categories. Before 
restrictions are tested, these observations are sorted into the closest category. Sorting them into the higher or 
lower category does not affect the conclusions of the restriction tests.    17 
involvement in Politics and Socioeconomic Conditions.
14 The latter variables are hence not 
treated as measured on an interval scale, but instead transformed into two threshold variables 
each, one for the top quartile of the distribution, and one for the bottom quartile.   
When data is collected at country level, spatial dependence of observations can 
arise. This is because the observed units are not randomly selected from a large population, 
which increases the likelihood of correlation between outcomes from adjacent units. To 
address this concern, covariance matrixes are estimated using the spatial correlation consistent 
covariance matrix estimator devised by Driscoll and Kraay (1998). This estimator is also 
robust for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation, the other two main sources of inco nsistent 
estimates in panel data estimation. 
 
6. Estimation results 
 
Table 2 displays estimates of equation (8) using a panel data model with country fixed effects. 
Looking first at the top row, we see that the coefficient on the productivity differential is 
positive and highly significant. A higher productivity in the oil producer’s traded goods sector 
vis-à-vis  that  of  the  foreign  economy  triggers  appreciation,  which  is  consistent  with  the 
Balassa-Samuelson effect. In row two we find the parameter for oil dependency variable. It is 
positive and statistically significant at the one percent level, indicating that a higher rate of oil 
exports relative to total GDP yields appreciation of the real exchange rate.  
The  remaining  rows  of  the  table  contain  the  parameter  estimates  for  the 
institutional variables interacted with the resource wealth measure. Four of the eight variables 
are statistically significant and enter with the expected signs. By comparing the coefficient 
sizes,  we  can  determine  their  order  of  importance  for  the  oil  price  real  exchange  rate 
                                                 
14 P-values of the Wald tests are as follows, Bureaucratic Quality: 0.25; Corruption: 0.16; Democratic 
accountability 0.21; Investment Profile: 0.48; Law and Order: 0.24; Military in Politics: 0.02; Socioeconomic 
Conditions: 0.00; Government Stability: 0.08.    18 
relationship. The largest coefficient corresponds to the indicator of bureaucratic quality. To 
interpret the negative sign of this parameter, we recall that all institutions are measured so that 
higher  values  indicate  stronger  legal  and  political  settings,  and  that  the  indicators  are 
normalized with mean zero. The effect on the real exchange rate from the oil price will run 
via the un-interacted oil dependency variable and through each of the institutional interaction 
terms.  We  can  thus  interpret  each  interaction  parameter  as  to  how  it  contributes  to  this 
combined effect. In this sense, the negative parameter estimate in the case of bureaucratic 
quality shows that countries with bureaucratic quality below the mean (negative values), will 
have  correspondingly  larger  appreciation  pressure  from  an  increasing  oil  price.  On  the 
contrary, countries with positive values on bureaucratic quality will have the appreciation 
triggered via the oil dependency variable mitigated by their institutional strength. In sum, the 
results  show  bureaucracy  plays  an  important  role  providing  a  spending  framework  that 
disincentives rent seeking and sudden shifts in spending policy.  
The second most important institutional variable is the index of law and order. 
Analogous to bureaucratic quality, the negative sign on the interaction term including this 
index shows that countries with strong legal systems can better insulate their currencies from 
oil price volatility. We can interpret this relationship as follows. High-quality legal systems 
can create and enforce  clear guidelines for the distribution of resource rents, and thereby 
reduce rent-seeking behaviour among special interest groups.  
Next, we focus on the role of military involvement in the political system. This 
variable has negative and significant parameter estimates both for countries with high military 
involvement  and  low  military  involvement.  In  the  case  of  low  involvement,  the  negative 
effect is in accordance with theory. Low military involvement corresponds to high political 
accountability and is therefore expected to be conductive toward more responsible revenue 
spending. In the case of high military involvement, the effect disappears in the robustness   19 
check  excluding  African  countries  (see  Table  A3,  Column  3).  Possibly,  high  military 
involvement is associated with more government stability and a reduction of business risk in 
the often highly volatile political systems on the African continent.  
The last significant institutional variable is the one measuring socioeconomic 
conditions. In the total sample, the results show that bad conditions, that is, a high level of 
poverty and unemployment, is associated with more real exchange rate appreciation following 
an oil price upturn. This result is in accordance with Eifert et al.’s (2002) conjecture that a 
lower degree of social consensus and, in particular, high social disparities, reduces the ability 
for  governments  to  set  long-term  spending  horizons  and  the  popular  influence  over  oil 
revenue spending. Finally, the estimation results suggest that the effect of the oil price on the 
currencies  of  oil-exporters  is  not  conditional  on  the  remaining  institutional  variables: 
corruption, democratic accountability, investment profile, or government stability. 
In column 2, Table 2, we exclude the non-significant variables from column 1 
and conclude that the estimation results remain largely unaltered. Further robustness tests are 
carried out by examining the effect of excluding Western countries, Middle Eastern countries 
and African countries respectively. Reported in Table A4 in Appendix, we see that the results 
are reasonably robust to these changes. An exception is the parameter on the interaction of oil 
wealth and bad socioeconomic conditions which falls out of the model when excluding either 
the African or Middle Eastern countries.  
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Table 2 Effects of the oil price on real exchange rates, conditional on legal and political 
institutions  
  (1)  (2)  Predicted Sign 
Productivity Differential  0.605*** 
(.144) 
0.634*** 
(.128)  + 
Ratio of Oil Exports to GDP  0.204*** 
(.089) 
0.144*** 
(.038)  + 
Institutional variables interacted with the 
ratio of oil exports to GDP       
Bureaucratic Quality  -0.178*** 
(.044) 
-0.176*** 
(.039)  - 
Corruption  0.027 
(.068)    - 
Democratic Accountability  -0.016 
(.032)    - 
Investment Profile  -0.017 
(.014)    - 
Law and Order  -0.156*** 
(.049) 
-0.168*** 
(.038)  - 
Low Government Stability  0.017 
(.024)    + 
High Government Stability  0.031 
(.043)    - 
High Military Presence in Politics  -0.064*** 
(.020) 
-0.057*** 
(.015)  + 
Low Military Presence in Politics  -0.056** 
(.024) 
-0.063*** 
(.020)  - 
Bad Socioeconomic Conditions  0.048* 
(.025) 
0.047* 
(.025)  + 
Good Socioeconomic Conditions  0.036 
(.032)    - 
R-squared  0.20  0.19   
Notes: The dependent variable is the combined time series of the real effective exchange rate and bilateral real 
exchange  rate  index  variables  in  logs.  Institutional  variables  are  measured  so  that  higher  values  indicate 
stronger/better institutions, and are standardized with mean zero and standard deviation one. The estimation 
includes  country-specific  fixed  effects,  and  Driscoll-Kraay  standard  errors  are  reported  in  parenthesis:  *, 
significant at 10%; **, significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
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We can now use the estimation results to draw some conclusions about the performance of 
individual oil-exporters. Figures 1 and 2 show the average country scores for the indicators of 
bureaucratic quality and law and order. Importantly, although perhaps not surprisingly, the 
western mature democracies Norway, Canada, and the UK have the highest average scores on 
both indicators, while predatory and non-democratic African regimes record the lowest. In the 
case  of  law  and  order,  the  high  scores  of  Middle  Eastern  states  are  also  noteworthy.  In 
particular, Saudi Arabia places fourth after the western democracies.    
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This paper highlighted the role of good political and legal institutions for the relationship 
between  the  oil  price  and  the  real  exchange  rates  of  oil-exporting  countries.  A  simple 
theoretical model was derived in which the effect of oil price movements on the real exchange 
rate of an oil-exporting economy depended on the degree of myopia in government spending 
of oil revenue. The empirical relevance of eight governance indicators, believed to affect the 
spending behaviour of governments, was evaluated on a panel of 33 oil exporters for the 
period 1985-2005.  
The main empirical finding is that the co-variation between the oil price and the 
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institutions. In particular, currencies in countries with strong bureaucracies and legal systems 
are less affected by oil price changes. This finding is in line with political economy models of 
rent-seeking  (Mehlum  et  al.  2005;  Tornell  et  al.,  1999)  but  adds  to  the  literature  by 
highlighting the importance of the inter-linkage between government spending decisions and 
the real exchange rate.  
There are several implications of the empirical results presented in this paper. 
First, they suggest that oil-exporting countries with sufficiently strong institutions can avoid 
the resource curse associated with a volatile real exchange rate. Secondly, the results provide 
an explanation for the ambiguous evidence in the empirical literature on real exchange rate 
determination in oil-producing economies. They indicate that the lack of strong positive price 
effects, even in the cases of heavily oil-dependent economies such as Norway, Canada or 
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Appendix A. Descriptive statistics and robustness checks 
 
Table A1 Missing data for continuous variables 






Ratio of Oil 
Exports to 
GDP 
Congo (Kinshasa)        85-94 
Algeria        97-2001 
Iran        91,92 
Argentina  X       
Egypt  X       
Indonesia  X       
Mexico  X       
Congo (Brazzaville)  X  97     
Angola  X  85-89     
Syria  X  03,04,05     
Kuwait  X    90,…,94   
Oman  X  85-99  2005  2005 
Vietnam  X  85-94,04    85-95 
Qatar  X    X  84-93,00,01 
Libya  X  2005  X  88,89 
Yemen  X  -89  -89  -89 
Note: Intervals indicate years for which data is missing, while an “X” indicates unavailability for all years.  
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Table A2 Variable descriptions and sources  
Real Effective Exchange Rate Index (Q): CPI deflated real effective exchange rate index, 
base year 2000 = 100 (in logs). Source: IFS, IMF. 
Real Bilateral Exchange Rate Index (Q): Real bilateral exchange rate index vis-à-vis the 
United states, base year 2000 = 100 (in logs). Source: WDI, WB. 
Real Oil Price (P): Average oil price in current USD deflated by US CPI, base year 2000 = 
100 (in logs). Source: IFS, IMF. 
Productivity Differential (PR): Log-difference between GDP per capita in PPP-based 
constant 2000 USD in the country and per capita GDP in the US. Source: WDI, WB. 
Ratio of Oil Exports to GDP (S): Ratio of net oil exports (Source: EIA), multiplied by the 
average oil price (Source: IFS, IMF), to total GDP (Source: WDI, WB). 
From Political Risk Services 
Bureaucratic Quality (0-4): Bureaucratic strength and expertise to govern without drastic 
changes in policy or interruptions in government services. Autonomy of the bureaucracy from 
political pressure and the existence of mechanisms for recruitment and training of bureaucrats. 
Corruption (0-6): Corruption within the political system, specifically excessive patronage, 
nepotism, job reservations, 'favour-for-favours’, secret party funding, and suspiciously close 
ties between politics and business.  
Democratic Accountability (0-6): Responsiveness of the government to its people, where 
points are awarded based on types of governance rated from the lowest number of points to 
the highest as  i) alternating democracy, ii) dominated democracy, iii) de-facto one-party 
state, iv) de jure one-party state, and v) autarchy. 
Government Stability (0-12): Sum of: government unity (0-4); legislative strength (0-4); and 
popular support (0-4).  
Investment Profile (0-12): Sum of: contract viability/expropriation (0-4); profits repatriation 
(0-4); and payment delays (0-4).  
Law and Order (0-6): Sum of: strength and impartiality of the legal system (0-3) and popular 
observance of the law (0-3).  
Military in Politics (0-6): Military involvement in politics, grading instances of involvement 
ranging from those caused by internal or external threat to a full-scale military regime.  
Socioeconomic Conditions (0-12): Sum of: unemployment (0-4); consumer confidence (0-4); 
and poverty (0-4).  
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Figure A1 Distributions of ordinal variables, Bureaucratic Quality, Corruption, Dempcratic 





Figure A2 Distributions of ordinal variables, Investment Profile, Law and Order, Military in 
Politics and Socioeconomic Conditions 
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Figure A3 Real oil price, 1985-2005   31 
Table A3 Robustness to regional exclusion: Western countries, Middle East, and Africa 
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R-squared  0.22  0.11  0.19 
N  488  452  421 
Notes: The dependent variable is the combined time series of the real effective exchange rate and bilateral real 
exchange  rate  index  variables  in  logs.  Institutional  variables  are  measured  so  that  higher  values  indicate 
stronger/better institutions, and are standardized with mean zero and standard deviation one. The estimation 
includes  country-specific  fixed  effects,  and  Driscoll-Kraay  standard  errors  are  reported  in  parenthesis:  *, 
significant at 10%; **, significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 